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Afghanistan’s ‘loya jirga” for Iraq!? In a recent joint television interview US Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar praised the “loya jirga” model used by the Kabul government and recommended its application to the reconstruction of Iraq. Before the complexity of the destruction of another state infra-structure is oversimplified and before a spurious adaptation of a tribal mechanism becomes a universal panacea for the rehabilitation of collapsed state structures in Central and West Asia we need to take a closer ethnographic look at this sodality essentially designed for dealing with differences in specific local settings. The jerga (with the first vowel as a short/soft ‘e’; assembly, council, gathering) is an informal ad hoc Pashtun tribal social arrangement for the resolution of specific local conflict. Usually convened adjacent to the local cemetery, the jerga seldom has more than two dozen adult male members. Decisions of the jerga are based on consensus; dissent is strongly discouraged and rarely allowed. Historicized in officially produced colorful fiction, various central governments of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-tribal Afghanistan have invented a distortion of this strictly tribal mechanism of local importance as a loya (Pashtu, grand) jerga for rubber stamping their decisions about major internal and international issues and problems. Members of the loya jerga were always hand picked by the central government and, in spite of this, its decisions were frequently distorted and manipulated. Even though (government selected) the loya jerga in Kabul during June 2002 overwhelmingly preferred the former king as Afghanistan’s leader, its decision was sidestepped in favor of Hamed Karzai by the combined agency of the United States and Kabul governments. The loya jerga was invented by the central governments of Afghanistan in the context of a superficial state structure to co-opt and pacify the Pashtun tribes and to intimidate the non-Pashtun population of the country with the alleged numerical majority and historical reputation of the latter—a vicious divide and rule tactic of playing Pashtuns against non-Pahtuns. In reality these governments themselves were neither tribal nor Pahtun and it was a mere speculation that Pashtuns constituted a numerical majority in the country. Thus, the loya jerga has served as a major divisive element in the political life of modern Afghanistan and is especially (and understandably) resented by non-Pashtuns. Neither has the loya jerga has produced any tangible political and economic benefits for the Pashtun tribes of the country. Instead of expunging this tribal appendage from the political framework of Afghanistan, the current Kabul government has disingenuously incorporated the loya jerga in the recent draft constitution (section 6, articles 110-115) as the “highest manifestation of the wishes of the people of Afghanistan”! It is a grave political mistake to legitimize the foundation of democratic institutions in Afghanistan with a divisive political instrument that, in its essential format, does not permit dissent and is restricted to men only. To do so would be a great disservice to the people of Afghanistan and will, once again, make the Afghan state subordinate and vulnerable to the (albeit imagined) domination and threat of tribal ideology. The upheavals of the last twenty five years have produced in the people of Afghanistan a robust and articulate sense of history and ethnic, linguistic, regional, and sectarian consciousness. They will not be manipulated again by the contortions of an unrepresentative government. They will undo all that the loya jerga has (or will) impose on them as soon as lawlessness, rampant violence, and the threat of force are removed from their lives and when they have access to democratic participatory political processes. The state format of Afghanistan should be dissociated from the actual and symbolic tribal accessories. Its infra-structural details must realistically (and symbolically) reflect all ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian variations. For the transitional period of 10-15 years, an arrangement independent of the dominance of specific individuals, in the framework of a multi-tiered collective leadership, has substantially more viability than the current US-produced one-man rule and the “quick fix” approach for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Iraq will do well without the Afghan version of loya jerga. The country has a firmer state structure and state-tribe relations have been constructed in such a way as to make tribe effectively subordinate to the state. And Iraq has a substantially more educated and professional component in its population. Afghanistan has a long way to go and, to achieve anything near the level of Iraq, it must first provide its population with at least one or two 1-12 grade cycles of education and, outgrow trappings of tribalism in the construction of its center. M. Jamil Hanifi, Ph. D. Retired Professor of Anthropology Independent Scholar Anthropology and the History of Afghanistan hanifi@msu.edu

Constitutional Politics: Moderate Idealists and Realists Debate the Afghan Constitution By Hekmat Sadat December 7, 2003 It seems as if everyone is disgruntled at the current constitutional change. Some extremists have called a jihad against President Karzai’s government and the constitution, while other extremists are calling for a return to the 1992 style of regime while strategically allying themselves with the Karzai government. While not employing violence, the moderates are also at odds in the emerging political battle over the constitution and future government of Afghanistan. These moderates make up the civil society but are grouped into the idealist and realist camps on the political landscape. According to the idealists, the success of the Afghan constitution is based on false hope and circumstantial assumptions. Without any tangible evidence, many of these idealists are hoping that the moderates will win power in the Loya Jirga and future government. Then the constitution can be interpreted as well as enforced by them in a sensible fashion. Realists, on the other hand, belief that the idealist’s theoretical assumptions are dangerous and risky way of looking at the situation. They refute the academic and conjecture argument that idealists make in regards to the constitutional draft and debate. Realists admit that many excellent points are stressed in the current draft, the Afghan constitution may become exploited to condemn every advocate of freedom and liberty who seek to bring democracy, peace, and justice to Afghanistan. Thus, extinguishing the hopes of Afghans and providing a new bases for the reemergence of extremist pro-theocratic elements eager to hijack democracy. The constitution threatens to establish a judicial theocracy wherein official charges of blasphemy, apostasy, and other calls could suppress advancement and progress as visible in recent months in two at least high profile cases by the current supreme court who has already manipulated a revised 1964 liberal constitution. The realists state what is to stop these justices in a more conservative constitution such as the current draft. While the English translation does not mention theocratic law, version of the original Dari and Pashto languages make references to theocratic law. Like this difference, The constitution promotes a dangerous nature even further because its formula for constitutional interpretation is much too complex. While the document is no where near the edicts of the last regime, nonetheless eleven separate articles in the constitution transform the constitution into a de facto theocracy. These articles restrict belief, speech, and action unlike that of most free democratic states. Without any parameters these articles will become tools of manipulation by extremist pro-theocratic elements and warlords to label those who wish to usher in liberty and democracy. It is not far fetched that a de jure theocratic state could follow in the future through the amendment process. The victims of these excess will have a tough time seeking understanding from members of the Supreme Court as they are encouraged to have no civil law exposure but can be graduates of the madrassas (seminary schools where the Taliban studied). The idealists argue this may be exactly what the Afghan people desire. The realist reject this idea because there is no quantifiable measure or mechanism to assess this assumption especially since only 2% of the population was consulted during the consultation phase. This raises the question of whether 25 million Afghans want a jihadi constitution and pro-theocratic government. What seems to be apparent is that trust is placed with pro-theocratic elements and warlords rather than in moderates. Furthermore, this constitutional draft implicitly legitimizes gender bias against women by not recognizing the equality of the spirits of men and women and their respective rights. Women underwent a terrible fate at the hands of pro-theocrats and it is necessary that the constitution explicitly resolve this issue to prevent further violations against them. Similarly, this constitution discriminates against the native inhabitants of Afghanistan, the Hindus and Sikhs, who were prosecuted and expelled at the hands of pro-theocrats. From a long list of languages which are to be promoted by the state, the language hindu Afghans speak is omitted although comparable to that speaking Pashaei. In addition, the implicit language in the oath of allegiance taken by the president, ministers, and supreme court justices disenfranchise Hindus and Sikhs from ever taken such an office. Furthermore, realists argue that this draft will be modified to become more theocratic when the Loya Jirga pressured by warlords and pro-theocrats meets to ratify the constitution in December 2003. The conservative establishment fear a true democracy in Afghanistan as power of the people would denote their extinction. Nonetheless, a democracy shrouded by some restrictive values will never empower the people but only reinforce the cartel role of pro-theocrats and warlords. While idealists are wooed by the prospective assumptions that everything will work out fine, whereas the realist state that the upcoming Loya Jirga must be urged to include specific explicit articles on liberty and freedom of conscience, belief and speech without other laws limiting these enshrined rights. The crucial language ensuring protection of core human rights to be explicitly introduced into the constitution. The constitution must assure all people residing in Afghanistan to be granted the most basic freedoms not be easily withdrawn by the government or any other establishment. If the Loya Jirga accomplish this task as well resolving some of the structural flaws, then Afghan constitution has the makings of a grand tool that will promote democracy, human rights, and individual liberties, and respect for religion and culture. Furthermore, the constitution must mention that children, orphans, disabled, widows, and other underprivileged must be protected and promoted by the government. The key to Afghanistan's success will be its ability to translate this constitution into law & order, national reconciliation, economic development, and a civil society something which both idealist and realist wish to realize. Debate on the constitution may involves the analysis of legalist who serve as technicians of the document. However, it also involves ordinary people who possess the sociopolitical and economics input for the document. The moderates in light of technical disputes are opening the way for pro-theocratic elements to hijack the Loya Jirga process and resolution. Idealists must realize that a victory for the pro-theocratic elements results in disenfranchisement of moderates, whether realists or idealists, from constitutional debate and even suppression.
Posted By: mariam   December 16th 2003, 2003 7:46 PM

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